1.
Introduction.
Since its start on January 1 th 1999 the design, implementation and transmission of the common monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) has been the subject of close scrutiny. An important question concerns the optimal monetary policy for the Euro-Area (EA). Among other things, this question also concerns the credibility of the ECB. Some observers have argued that the ECB practically inherited the reputation and commitment towards low inflation of the Bundesbank. Others have assumed that as a complete new institution, the ECB would lack initially such a possibility to commit its policies vis-à-vis the private sector and that it would need time to earn a reputation. In other words, starting from a regime with discretionary policymaking, it may only gradually establish a policy regime with commitment in its policies.
From the academic side, e.g. adopting inflation targeting has been proposed for the ECB to foster credibility.
Optimal monetary policy under commitment and discretion has received ample interest in the recent
New-Keynesian (NK) literature but most results relate to a closed economy setting and ignore the presence of fiscal policy. Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003) demonstrate that in the closed-economy NK model if expectations are entirely forward-looking the optimal monetary policy is history dependent under commitment and contemporaneous under discretion following a cost-push shock. The history dependency under commitment gives rise to an improved trade-off between output and inflation variability as it enables the monetary authorities to smooth out over time the adjustments resulting from the cost-push shock. Jensen (2002) shows that in a closed-economy setting without fiscal policy, with purely forward-looking output and inflation expectations and a monetary authority that has no interest rate smoothing objective, the distinction between commitment and discretion is essentially only relevant in the presence of cost-push shocks. There, stabilization of output and inflation is subject to such a trade-off between the variability of output and inflation. Demand and potential output shocks do not pose such dilemmas as monetary policy can then always be set -both under commitment and discretion-to perfectly offset demand shocks and to perfectly accommodate potential output shocks.
It has also been argued from various sides that rather than focusing on optimal policy, there is a clear need for using simple policy rules given the presence of such initial institutional uncertainties and also because of large uncertainties of the actual workings of the EA economy (model uncertainty), the lack of consistent EA data (data uncertainty) and the possibility of structural breaks (parameter uncertainty) due to establishment of the EA. Following that logic, it has been argued that the ECB would better follow a simple policy rule according to which its monetary policy reacts in a predefined manner to important macroeconomic variables like output and inflation in the EA. A large number of empirical studies have estimated Taylor rules for the EA and find that such simple rules are adequate to characterize actual policymaking.
In this paper we analyze the effects of alternative monetary policy regimes using a stylized NK model that is estimated and simulated using EA data. The analysis enables to analyze: (i) optimal monetary policy under commitment or discretion and compare with ad-hoc monetary policy based on simple rules, (ii) the effects of fiscal policies and foreign variables on monetary policy, (iii) the effects of fiscal deficit and interest rate smoothing objectives and the amount of forward-looking in the model. We extend the results in the literature in three directions using simulations of an estimated model of the EA. Firstly, we show that both monetary policy itself and the transmission of monetary policy are dependent on the type of monetary policy regime, the type of macroeconomic shocks and the structural characteristics of the economy, including the fiscal policy regime. It is showed that if output and inflation expectations also contain backward-looking elements, the results of the literature indicated above need to be modified further as the backward-looking components generate persistence of output and price adjustments prohibiting immediate full stabilization of demand and productivity shocks.
Secondly, the presence of an active fiscal policy may complicate the management of monetary policy in particular if its effects are contrary to the objectives of the monetary policymakers, e.g. in case of a positive demand shock, the monetary policy will be restrictive to contain inflationary pressure. In those conditions, an expansionary fiscal policy shock will run counter to the monetary policy objectives, evoking a policy conflict between the monetary and fiscal policymakers. In an open economy setting, the management of monetary policy is complicated further. The exchange rate becomes an important channel of transmission of monetary policy affecting thereby real and nominal adjustments after macroeconomic shocks. Given the link between interest rates and exchange rate expectations according to the UIP hypothesis, monetary policies will affects outcomes both via the interest channel and the exchange rate channel. The transmission via the exchange rate channel will depend on the pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations on domestic inflation and the effect of real exchange rates on net exports. In an open economy setting, optimal monetary policies will therefore depend also on the degree of pass-trough in the economy and the sensitiveness of net exports w.r.t. international competitiveness. Commitment is even more important than in a closed economy:
the introduction of another forward-looking variable in form of exchange rate expectations implies additional time-inconsistency problems for the monetary policymaker related to the exchange rate channel of monetary policy.
Thirdly, policymakers are typically also concerned about instrument smoothing. In case of instrument smoothing policymakers perceive instrument variability as undesirable/costly and thus prefer lower and more gradual adjustment of the policy instruments to high and rapid changes in policy variables.
The inclusion of interest rate smoothing generates history dependence in monetary policy even in an otherwise purely forward-looking model. Similarly, deficit smoothing will lead to a fiscal policy that only gradually adjusts. This implies that several results need to be modified, e.g. the immediate full stabilization of demand and potential output shocks will not be optimal because of the implied interest rate variability and adjustments under monetary policy with commitment and discretion will differ.
The paper has been structured as follows: Section 2 proposes a stylized NK model. Section 3 discusses the design of monetary policy in this model. In Section 4, we report estimation results for the EA of the model using system Bayesian estimation. Section 5 discusses the simulation results for various shocks using the model of the EA estimated in Section 4. In Section 6 some sensitivity analysis of the outcomes w.r.t. two crucial model parameters is undertaken. The conclusion summarizes our main results.
A stylized NK model of the EA.
The NK research agenda aims at providing a stronger micro-economic underpinning of aggregate demand and aggregate supply analysis and the resulting policy prescriptions. Aggregate demand is driven by the optimizing behavior of households that maximize an intertemporal utility function. Aggregate supply is the result of firms that set the prices for their products so as to maximize profits in a monopolistic competition setting. Governments decide upon monetary and fiscal policies and the small open economy is connected to the rest of the world through a trade in goods and financial assets by a foreign sector and the exchange rate is determined. The setup of the NK model in this paper is rather standard and follows largely well-known expositions such as McCallum and Nelson (1999) and is similar e.g. to Giordani (2004) , Muscatelli et al. (2004) , Svensson (2000) , Leitemo et al. (2002) , Jensen (2002) and others. The Appendix derives the main relations and solves the policy optimization problem confronting the policymakers.
The basic blocs of the model are the aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves, the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition and the design of monetary and fiscal policies. Concerning the latter: we try to include in the model a number of aspects that are relevant for actual monetary and fiscal policies in the EA, in particular the distinction between monetary policy commitment versus discretion and restrictions on fiscal flexibility in the form of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
The aggregate demand -IS curve-, of the EA economy 1 takes the following form:
( ) 2 In practice, it may be quite complicated to determine the equilibrium real rate of interest, r , as the study on real equilibrium interest rates in the EA by Giammarioli and Valla (2003) shows. Similar to estimating equilibrium output y and equilibrium inflation p ∆ it would be crucial, however, for the monetary authority to get its estimation on this variable right.
and a demand shock. The backward-looking component in the IS curve can be explained e.g. by " habit formation" in consumption decisions 3 . The forward-looking part is produced by rational, intertemporally maximizing agents that apply the principles of optimal " consumption smoothing" . In case consumers are entirely forward looking ( shocks) which will be interpreted as supply-shocks in the remainder of the analysis since (3) can also be considered as describing the short-run aggregate supply (AS) curve. In addition, the supply side of the economy can be hit by shocks to potential output viz. productivity shocks.
If 1 ω = , we obtain the backward-looking Phillips curve, if 0 ω = , on the other hand, we obtain the forward-looking NK Phillips curve 6 . In the first case, only past economic conditions matter for current inflation. In the presence of forward-looking expectations, current price setting depends on expectations about future economic conditions. The hybrid Phillips curve assumes that both backward and forwardlooking price setting are present, it results if ω lies in between 0 and 1. 7 The hybrid Phillips curve allows for 3 This IS curves nests several alternative formulations that can be found in the literature: the current output gap can be positively related to past output gaps only (Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , Huh and Lansing (2000) ), both past and expected future output gaps, Clarida et al., (1999) ), or expected future output gaps only (McCallum (2001) , Woodford (2001) ). Leith and Malley (2002) , Batini et al. (2003) and McCallum and Nelson (1999) provide micro-foundations for the presence of habit formation in consumption. Empirical evidence is provided that the backward looking component in consumption is substantial. 4 For empirical studies on deviations of UIP see e.g. Jeanne and Rose (2002) . McCallum and Nelson (1999) analyze the effects of deviations from UIP on the exchange rate and the current account in a framework that is related to ours. 5 See e.g. Gagnon and Ihrig (2002) , Leitemo et al. (2002) , Coenen and Wieland (2002) that use similar open economy Phillips curves. 6 See e.g. Clarida et al. (1999) for a similar analytical framework and a detailed discussion on the generalised IS (1) and Phillips curves (2). They illustrate how ψ and ω jointly determine the endogenous inflation and output persistence. Leith and Malley (2002) derive (2) from the overlapping contracts model á la Calvo. 7 In empirical applications, more lags of output (in case of the IS curve) and output and inflation (Phillips curve) are often included to improve the empirical fit. Adding these lags will also induce a more persistent and therefore more realistic adjustment to shocks. In empirical studies and monetary policy analysis sometimes concepts of equilibrium and/or core inflation are added to (2), to distinguish short-run fluctuations of inflation from longer term, equilibrium inflation. In our analysis this issue is not dealt with and inflation (as all other variables) is defined in terms of deviations from (possibly non-zero inflation) steady-state. See Vega and Wynne (2003) and references therein on core inflation in the EA.
both a forward-looking component and a backward-looking component, reflecting e.g. learning effects, staggered contracts or other institutional arrangements that affect pricing behavior.
The output gap proxies the effects of demand-pull factors on the general price level. Foreign inflation spillovers affect domestic prices via the price of imported raw materials, and intermediate and final goods used in the domestic production process. The strength of the foreign inflation and depreciation spillovers, depends not only on the intensity with which foreign goods are absorbed but also on the amount of pass-through in import pricing. Recent empirical research suggests that pass-through is generally nonnegligible. 8 Inflation will be affected by changes in the exchange rate through the direct effect via import prices, implying cost-push inflation. Exchange rate changes can also affect inflation indirectly through aggregate demand, since they will affect the relative price between domestic and foreign goods, thereby influencing net exports and domestic output, which in turn will affect prices through demand-pull inflation. In the model, macroeconomic shocks lead to fluctuations in output and prices. This will affect the interest rate and through (5) the exchange rate. External exchange rate adjustment in the form of changes of the euro exchange rate, therefore, remains a potentially important shock absorber in the EA, in particular in case the shocks are of foreign origin. In fact, whereas a monetary union precludes internal exchange rate adjustments by definition, external exchange rate adjustments may partly take over as a shock absorber. In the context of the EA, one should in other words not only focus on the interest rate channel of its monetary policy but also the exchange rate channel is important in assessing the transmissions of monetary policy of the ECB. Concerning fiscal policy we assume that net government spending is determined by a fiscal policy rule. Taylor (2000) , developed a framework for simple fiscal policies that relate net government spending to the structural fiscal balance, g , and the cyclical fiscal stance, as measured by the automatic stabilizers
the elasticity of the deficit to cyclical output fluctuations times output. In addition, we allow for the possibility of deficit smoothing and the occurrence of stochastic deficit shocks, u g : λ would mean a very inert -but highly persistent-fiscal policy that could be explained by difficulties to implement changes in tax policies (e.g. pension reforms) and government spending (e.g. healthcare reforms).
The fiscal policy rule (4) enables to represent in the model -albeit in a highly stylized way-the various budgetary rules and strategies one may observe in practice. Here, we would like also to relate the fiscal policy rules with the provisions in the Stability and Growth Pact. The budgetary target g can be thought e.g. as being the " close-to balance or in surplus medium term objective" , reflecting a preference for long-run sustainability and neutrality. The flexibility in the Stability Pact relates in particular to the degree to which the automatic stabilizers in the short-run are allowed to function. Here, the amount of inertia in fiscal policy, summarized by g λ , reflects the ability of fiscal policymakers to adjust fiscal policy in the short-run. If g λ = 0 fiscal flexibility is the highest and the fiscal balance only driven by the automatic stabilizers. If g λ increases, fiscal flexibility declines, implying more persistence in fiscal adjustments, more " smoothing" of deficits. In the limiting case where g λ = 1, fiscal deficits do not adjust at all over time. Ignoring fiscal shocks, this would imply the absence of fiscal stabilization. This element of deficit smoothing seems therefore quite related to the recent discussion on the question if the SGP is not too rigid in some circumstances and should not be amended in any form to become more flexible and e.g. to let automatic stabilizers work freely in a recession.
Monetary Policy: Optimal policies vs. ad hoc rules
be added to our analysis as well by adding domestic inflation to the RHS of (2).
As noted in the introduction, it is of significant importance, whether the monetary authorities would be able or not to implement its policies under discretion or commitment. In our dynamic NK model, the difference between the commitment and discretionary case results from the forward-looking part of the model (the expectations of the private sector about output, inflation and exchange rates) and is essentially an extension to a dynamic setting of the time-inconsistency problem in the well-known static setting á la Barro-Gordon. It is important to realize here that the transmission of monetary policy also takes place through the private expectations about current and future monetary policy behavior, the s.c. expectations channel of monetary policy.
Commitment enables the policymaker to smooth the stabilization costs over time: if a macroeconomic shock hits the economy, the policymaker can announce a path of current and future policy actions and credibly implement this strategy. The private sector sets its expectations accordingly. Under discretion, such announcements of future policy contingent on past commitments are not credible. As a result, under commitment adjustments of interest rates and inflation will typically display more inertial adjustment and less volatility than under discretion, given this ability to smooth out the adjustment costs over time. Under discretion, policies and inflation are excessively volatile in the short run compared to the commitment case and also welfare losses will be higher with discretionary policymaking due to the existence of a stabilization bias in the short-run 9 . The differences between commitment and discretion will vanish when output and inflation expectations become increasingly backward-looking 10 , since in that case the private sector expectations are less and less affected by policy commitments, or stated differently, optimal policies will suffer less and less from time-inconsistency problems when expectations become less and less forward-looking. In a purely backward-looking model, the time-inconsistency problems of optimal monetary policy disappear by definition.
It is this basic optimal monetary policy problem that our analysis will focus. We extend this problem by adding a few elements (i) comparing optimal monetary policy under commitment or discretion with adhoc monetary policy based on simple rules, (ii) the effects of interest rate smoothing objectives and the degree of forward-looking of expectations, (iii) the effects of fiscal policies and foreign variables on monetary policy.
Concerning the design of monetary policy by the ECB, we will distinguish between two different settings: (i) a setting where the ECB implements an optimal policy, where we need to distinguish between discretion and commitment strategies.
(ii) a setting where the ECB implements an ad-hoc policy rule.
Following the terminology of Svensson (2000) , the first case falls into the category of targeting rules and the second case into the category of instrument rules.
Targeting rules seek to determine optimal policy responses to economic conditions, given a set of objectives. In the context of the above model, we look at the policy strategies that minimize the following intertemporal quadratic loss function of the ECB: From an institutional point of view, the advantage of simple rules is their transparency and their ease to in communicating and monitoring to/by the outside world. It is therefore interesting to confront the targeting rule in (5) with the alternative of a simple instrument rule like the Taylor rule:
with i rp ≡ +∆ (cf. footnote 2). The feedback on the output gap and inflation are standard in arguments of the Taylor rule. A feedback on the exchange rate has been investigated in some open-economy Taylor rules, and we have followed Taylor (2001) in this specification 11 . Monacelli (1999) shows that, under incomplete exchange rate pass-through, an exchange rate augmented Taylor rule performs better than the standard Taylor rule (be it based on CPI inflation or domestic inflation) in terms of inflation stabilization (but not in terms of output stabilization). The preference for instrument smoothing is measured by the value of i λ , where 01 i λ ≤≤ if i λ goes to zero the original Taylor rule, which ignores instrument-smoothing objectives, is obtained. Interest rate shocks can be either the result of money demand shocks or of discretionary monetary policy impulses (in that last case monetary policy according to (6) contains both a " rules" and a " discretion" part).
It is useful to note that the Taylor rule above can be seen as an example out of a broader class of simple policy rules. Along this line, Söderlind (1999) defines simple policy rules as optimal policies that result from the general optimal policy problem defined under (i) but augmented with restrictions on the coefficients and/or number of state variables to which the policymaker reacts. This definition of the simple rules case as a restricted optimal policy problem is shown by the equivalent structure of both solutions in terms of optimal policy. Depending on the amount of restrictions, the policy rule can be made more or less complicated and in the absence of restrictions the optimal policy under commitment results. In this interpretation the parameters {,,,} i iii λφχµ that the CB operates would be resulting from the solving an optimal monetary policy problem like under (i) but one with a set of additional restrictions.
Estimation of the EA model.
In this section we estimate the model presented in Section 4 for the EA. Quarterly data of EA output, prices, interest rates, fiscal deficit, and euro dollar exchange rate are taken from Eurostat from 1980:I to 2005:IV.
For the period before 1999 when the EA did not exist yet, Eurostat compiles EA data using weighted averages of harmonized national data. Figure 1 displays the adjustment EA variables during this period.
Foreign output, prices and interest rates are approximated by the respective U.S. variables taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The methodology used to estimate the EA model is the so-called system Bayesian estimation, which has been widely used in recent papers. In order to compute the joint sample likelihood and get the estimators, we use the Kalman filter. The paper by Ratto et al. (2005a) discusses this method in detail; moreover, their and our computations are performed using the DYNARE toolbox for Matlab (see Juillard (2005) ).
In order to obtain Bayesian estimates for the whole system independent prior densities for each of the 31 model parameters that need to be estimated, are formulated and the variables are de-trended to take out the effects of economic growth and trend inflation. The choice of these prior densities is based on the empirical estimates on the EA in the literature surveyed in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 here]
These empirical studies suggest that the EA economy is characterized by a (i) substantial degree of backward looking in output and inflation, (ii) a substantial degree of deficit and interest rate smoothing in the policy rules. The estimated monetary and fiscal rules of Table 1 are a relatively accurate representation of policies in the EA: empirical estimates of policy rules typically can explain monetary and fiscal policy with a high degree of accuracy.
Given our first guess or priors for the model parameters, we can then proceed by confronting priors, model and data with each other and estimate the EA model using the priors and the data collected. We report in Table 2 estimation results of the model parameters and standard deviation of shocks.
implications and the more so if the exchange rate feedback is small, of course.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In a few cases, the posterior densities seem sensitive to the assumed prior densities. This suggests that such coefficients are estimated with a limited degree of accuracy. This possibility is also warned for by Onatski and Williams (2003) , Smets and Wouters (2002) , Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) and Levin et al. (2005) who
show that point estimates of the posterior means and corresponding standard errors and of standard deviations of the shocks are conditional on the estimation methodology, the sample (duration) and the values of calibrated (non-stochastic) parameters. In most cases, however, the parameters appear to be adequately estimated.
It turns out that the first guesses in Table 1of the model parameters based on the estimates in other empirical studies in most cases were not wholly unfounded. Output is somewhat more backward-looking and inflation more forward-looking that the prior of 0.5. Our priors about monetary and fiscal policy rules were fairly adequate. In the remainder of the paper we will therefore assume that the monetary and fiscal rules based on the estimates of Table 2 (and since we confirm them, also the estimates of the policy rules in Table   1 ) are a relatively accurate representation of actual policies in the EA. The posterior distributions always have a smaller dispersion than the distribution of the priors suggesting that the information that prior densities carry out can be made substantially more precise by confronting them with the actual data of the euro-area.
The effects of macroeconomic shocks: A simulation analysis.
This section uses simulations to illustrate a number of insights that can be obtained from the model introduced in Section 3 and estimated in Section 4. We simulate the effects of demand shocks, cost-push shocks, potential output shocks, fiscal shocks, exchange rate shocks and foreign shocks in the model of the EA. All shocks are 1 percent in size, occur in period 0, are unanticipated and have zero persistence. The assumption of zero persistence of shocks is needed here to be able to strictly concentrate on the impact of shocks and their subsequent propagation by the dynamics of the model and macroeconomic policy actions (e.g in terms of commitment and discretion). In case of persistent shocks such an analysis is no longer possible and the effects are a combination of persistence of shocks, structural model dynamics and dynamics of policy). In that case a simulation analysis would have little (if any) ability to analyze e.g. the effects of different policy regimes -like we want to do in this paper-.as one could not disentangle the dynamics produced by the persistence of the shock from the dynamics inherent in the macro-economic structure and macro-economic policies.
As outlined above, we compare the adjustments under three scenarios: (i) optimal monetary policy in case of policy discretion, (ii) optimal monetary policy in case of commitment, (iii) ad-hoc monetary policy rule. The last regime can be interpreted as (a close approximation of) the actual monetary policy strategy of the ECB and the fiscal policy in the EA, given that its parameters were estimated in the previous section. The simulations of the shocks provide (a) impulse response functions that give the dynamics adjustments resulting from the shocks, including the transmission of macroeconomic policies (b) variances and welfare losses resulting from stochastic simulations of these shocks (based on 100 replications), allowing us to investigate into more detail aspects of efficiency. In these simulations we in particular want to obtain insights into: (i) optimal monetary policies of the ECB both under discretion and commitment and in comparison to a simple monetary policy rule, (ii) the consequences of alternative fiscal policy rules in the EA, (iii) the effects of foreign shocks, the dynamics of the euro exchange rate and EA trade balance, (v) the role of alternative degrees of backward and forward looking in output and inflation.
The parameters of the IS curve ( ,, ,,, αησδγτ), Phillips curve ( , ψω) and monetary and fiscal policy rules ( ,,,,, i iiigg λφχµλχ) are set to the values estimated for the EA in the previous section and presented in Table 2 . The values of the monetary policy preference parameters ( , ,,, βξνκ Γ ) are set equal to [0.995, 1, 0.5, 0.5,0] in the baseline. Naturally, outcomes may be more or less specific to this set of baseline assumptions. In case of small changes in the parameters, the differences compared to the baseline are typically of a quantitative nature rather than a qualitative nature. If changes get larger, the results can also change qualitatively. In Section 5 we will undertake some sensitivity analysis to try to shed some light on that aspect of the analysis. To some extent our results are likely to be model-specific as well. However, we noted that in several cases larger, estimated EA models yield similar adjustments as in our model in case The demand shock increases output in the short-run which induces inflation. The ECB reacts by raising the interest rate. This causes an initial appreciation after which the exchange rate depreciates according to the UIP condition, in other words exchange rate overshooting occurs. The increase of the real interest rate and the (nominal and real) appreciation contribute to a stabilization of output and inflation. The automatic stabilizers of the fiscal policy rule generate a fiscal surplus which also contributes to the stabilization of output and inflation. The real appreciation and increase in output causes a current account deficit. It is seen that the monetary policy regime has some impact on the outcomes produced by the demand shock.
Compared to discretion, commitment results in a more smooth adjustment of the interest rate and inflation, reflecting the stabilization bias present under discretion as noted in the introduction. The actual monetary policy rule case with strong interest rate smoothing is marked by a somewhat higher persistence in the adjustments compared to optimal policies under commitment and discretion. Because of the high degree of interest rate and deficit smoothing, macroeconomic policies react too slowly and the policies are moreover persistent, implying that at some point in time they actually may contribute to fluctuations in output and inflation. It is directly seen that in case of demand shocks, commitment reduces in particular inflation variability compared to discretion, contributing to the lower losses under commitment. The Taylor rule case leads to the highest variance of inflation and interest rate changes. The difference in losses between commitment and discretion and between discretion and the Taylor rule based on actual estimates for the EA are substantial (in the order of 25-50% mostly), but not dramatic an observation that is also seen in the other examples below.
[Insert Table 3 here]
ii) A positive cost-push shock
Next, we analyse the effects of a non-persistent one percent cost-push shock in Figure 3 A cost-push shock results in stagflation: there is a substantial decline in output and a burst in inflation. Given the prevalence of inflation stabilization in its motives, the ECB raises the interest rate. The inflation and initial appreciation erode competitiveness and the current account deteriorates. The prolonged recession and the presence of deficit smoothing imply a substantial fiscal deficit. This implies a policy conflict with the ECB: whereas the ECB follows a restrictive policy, the fiscal policy is expansionary. That in particular cost-push shocks are prone to policy conflicts as monetary and fiscal policies tend to act as policy substitutes rather than complements, has also been note in several empirical studies, see e.g. Muscatelli et al. (2004) for an insightful application to the U.S. case.
The difference in adjustment dynamics between commitment and discretion are considerable and more substantial than in the previous case. Commitment produces a smoother stabilization of inflation and less strong monetary policy intervention than discretion. The difference essentially results from the ECB being able to credibly commit to the optimal path of its instrument, thereby effectively managing inflation expectations and avoiding a short-term stabilization bias. The Taylor rule induces adjustments patterns that lie somewhere between discretion and commitment. The resulting losses in Table 2 show that commitment leads to considerably lower losses than discretion and the Taylor rule case. The results in column II can be directly compared with the case of the demand shock: for a given policy setting, a 1% cost-push shock has considerably stronger effects on the variability of inflation, output gap and interest rates than a 1% demand shock. Also, commitment is relatively more valuable when facing cost-push shocks than when facing demand-shocks.
iii) A positive productivity shock
The effects of a purely transitory one percent productivity shock ( [Insert Figure 4 here]
The negative output gap that initially results and that turns positive thereafter is a combination of the initial shock to potential output and the resulting increase in actual output. Inflation tends to drop initially, especially in the case of discretion and the simple rule case, thereby evoking an expansionary monetary policy in the form of lower interest rates. The exchange rate depreciation that is produced stimulates inflation. The depreciation also contributes to output and a current account surplus: it boosts competitiveness as the real exchange rate also depreciates. The small fiscal surplus is resulting from the increase in output.
Under commitment, inflation is less volatile and stabilizes again faster as in the other cases. As noted earlier, commitment avoids the emergence of a suboptimal stabilization bias that is present in the discretion case. The resulting lower volatility of inflation, interest rates and exchange rates is a general feature of the commitment regime also found in the other examples (cf. Table 3 ). In most cases the initial output fluctuations are larger under commitment but thereafter also output tends to stabilize faster under commitment. Compared to optimal policies, the monetary policy rule regime is marked by higher persistence in the fluctuations in particular in inflation but also in other variables. Most of the observations concerning losses and variances for different monetary policy regimes in the previous examples are also seen here.
Interestingly, this example (like the first example concerning demand shocks) illustrates that the conclusion of Jensen (2002) that the distinction between commitment and discretion is practically only relevant in case of cost-push shocks needs to be modified in this more general setting of the NK model. The presence of backward-looking output and inflation dynamics, an interest rate smoothing objective, the presence of fiscal policy and the link between interest rates and exchange rates in an open economy context, imply that commitment and discretion result in different outcomes also in case of demand and productivity shocks.
iv) A positive fiscal shock
The effects of a fiscal shock (v g (0) = 1%) are shown in Figure 5 .
[Insert Figure 5 here]
A very important effect produced by fiscal shocks comes from the fiscal rule itself: the initial shock leads to a dynamic adjustment process in the fiscal deficit itself due to the deficit smoothing mechanism. Persistence in the fiscal rule implies that the initial fiscal shock has strong persistence as well. This is clearly seen in the adjustment of the deficit in Figure 5 , where a clear deficit bias is seen. Some of the adjustments are related to the adjustments we saw in Figure 1 : a fiscal shock is in the first place also an aggregate demand shock. The expansionary fiscal policy is counteracted by a restrictive monetary policy in order to combat inflation. In contrast to Figure 1 where the automatic stabilizers result in a counter-cyclical fiscal policy that is supportive of monetary policy, here we observe the opposite. The pro-cyclical fiscal policy seen now is not in line with the restrictive monetary policy that aims at combating inflation. The induced appreciation of the exchange rate reduces the competitiveness so that net exports are crowded out and the current account remains in deficit. Concerning variability of output, inflation and interest rate and welfare losses we reach similar conclusions as in case of the demand shocks. Commitment hardly achieves gains over discretion here.
v) A positive exchange rate shock
As discussed earlier, adjustment of the euro is an important variable in the dynamic adjustments in the EA model. Figure 6 displays the effects from a one-time shock to the euro (v e (0) = 1%).
[Insert Figure 6 here] The (euro depreciation) shock induces modest but highly cyclical fluctuations in output and inflation. A depreciation both contributes to higher output and inflation. Monetary policy commitment delivers significant gains in stabilizing inflation and output compared to discretionary monetary policy and rule-based monetary policy.
vi) A positive foreign output shock
Since the EA is an open economy, it is interesting to analyze the transmission of foreign shocks in the EA and how these affect monetary policy of the ECB e.g. Figure 6 shows the adjustments produced by a foreign output shock (v y* (0) = 1%).
[Insert Figure 6 here]
The direction of the effects are very similar to those produced by a demand shock but the size of the effects are smaller given that net exports are only a fraction of total demand. In addition, the foreign output shock leads to a current account surplus rather than a deficit. Also the conclusions concerning welfare losses and variability of inflation, output, interest rates and exchange rates in the different regimes are essentially the same as in the case of the demand shock in (i).
A robustness /sensitiveness check of the results.
The results obtained above were based on the set of parameters that was obtained from the estimation of the model. Though their values seemed plausible, e.g. also when comparing them with other empirical estimations in the literature, it may well be that some values were estimated imprecisely, as some confidence intervals suggested. It is therefore interesting and useful to check if the results change if we change parameters from their estimated (baseline) values. We focus on two parameters in the model that play a crucial role as they are crucially related to the design and effects of monetary and fiscal policy.
(i) the degree of forward-looking of the Phillips curve, ω . Since ω determines the relative importance of forward and backward looking inflation expectations, it plays a crucial role in the AS curve and the effects of commitment vs. discretion. Commitment becomes more important in a more forwardlooking model since it is there where commitment can make a difference. The higher the degree of forwardlooking, the more commitment matters, and the more adjustment under commitment differs from discretion, think e.g. of the stabilization bias problem associated with discretion. Therefore, the amount of forwardlooking in the Phillips curves plays a crucial role in the transmission of shocks and policymaking. We focus here on the role of forward-looking w.r.t. inflation 12 . Figure 8 shows the effects of varying ω . We show these cases for the three monetary policy regimes since the effects of changing the amount of forward looking is likely to depend -among many other things-also on the monetary policy regime. Moreover, we will look both to the case of demand shocks (panel (a)) and cost-push shocks (panel (b)), since the conclusions may not necessarily be the same under different type of shocks.
[Insert Figure 8 here]
12 Note that also the degree of backward/forward-looking in the IS curve, , plays an important role. In order not to
(ii) the degree of fiscal policy flexibility, g λ . The degree of fiscal policy activism/inertia g λ is a crucial parameter in the fiscal policy rule: with a increasing value of g λ fiscal policy gets more and more inflexible in terms of reacting to output fluctuations. It is therefore interesting to compare outcomes when fiscal policy gets less and less flexible. In Figure 9 the variance of inflation and output gap and losses are plotted as a function of the degree of deficit smoothing, g λ in case of a demand shock (panel (a)) and a costpush shock (panel (b)).
[Insert Figure 9 here]
In case of demand shocks, less fiscal flexibility raises the variance of the output gap and inflation and implies higher losses. The effects are particularly strong on output and inflation variability under commitment: given that monetary management is set in an optimal manner, a very inflexible and inadequate fiscal policy leads to inefficiently high output and inflation fluctuations. Optimal results would be obtained by granting full fiscal flexibility. Under cost-push shocks the picture is quite different: less fiscal flexibility leads to lower losses initially, only when g λ increases above about 0.7, losses start to increase again. This suggests that from the perspective of the monetary policymaker (or society if one interprets the loss function of the monetary authorities as representing also society' s preferences), fiscal flexibility is preferred in case of demand shocks, but in case of cost-push shocks constraints on fiscal flexibility are needed; but there is also an upper limit on the restraint of fiscal flexibility. This outcome is robust across the three monetary policy regimes.
This notion that the effects of monetary policy 13 depend very much on the type of shocks the policy maker is facing, the type of monetary policy regime is in place and the structural characteristics of the economy, can be made more explicit by working out the sensitivity analysis above even further. In Figure   10 , it is shown how for the different type of shocks, the best outcomes the monetary authorities can obtain in terms of variability of output and inflation evolve in each policy regime with different values of ω .and g λ .
[Insert Figure 10 here]
This enables one to trace how the outcomes evolve as a function of the amount of backward-looking in inflation expectations and the degree of fiscal flexibility. One can see clearly that the effects of more forward-looking inflation expectations or of more fiscal flexibility differ greatly across shocks the different monetary regimes and the type of macro-economic shocks.
confuse the effects of both, we will keep constant here. 13 In the dynamic simulation examples in Figures 2-7 we saw already how the monetary policy reaction itself depends on the type of shock and the policy regime in place. A next important question addressed here is how the effect of monetary policy reaction depend on the type of shock, the policy regime in place and the structure of the economy.
Conclusions
In this paper, we focused on the role of the monetary policy regime using a stylized NK model and applied the framework to the case of the EA. A number of issues relating to monetary management surface regularly in the EA context. To illustrate these issues, we analyzed the effects of a series of macroeconomic shocks to assess their impact on monetary policy in the EA model. The difference between the monetary policy regimes was focused upon and seen to be a function of many mechanisms. The effects of monetary policy were shown to depend upon the monetary policy regime: whether monetary policy was implemented under commitment, discretion or a rule-based framework was seen to have important consequences.
The existing NK literature on optimal monetary policy under commitment and discretion typically concentrates on cost-push shocks and to a setting with purely forward-looking expectations, in a closed economy and ignoring the absence of interest rate smoothing objectives and an active fiscal policy. It finds that in that setting, the difference between commitment and discretion is only important in case of cost-push shocks since potential output and demand shocks are always fully stabilized in both cases.
This setting, however, is not likely to adequately represent conditions in the EA. Our analysis indeed
showed that the introduction of backward-looking expectations, an interest rate smoothing objective, active fiscal policy and an open economy setting, implies that the existing results on monetary policy in the NK model may need modifications. In particular, it was seen that when extensions of the NK model are undertaken, the distinction between commitment and discretion is important not only in case of cost-push shocks but also in case of demand, potential output and foreign shocks.
We highlighted the role of external factors and fiscal policy for monetary policy in the EA. In an open economy like the EA, exchange rate adjustment and foreign shocks are of fundamental importance and may substantially change adjustment dynamics compared to a closed economy setting. This has implications for monetary policy in the EA: not only the interest rate channel of monetary policy will determine outcomes, but also the exchange rate channel, via pass-through and competitiveness effects. Fiscal policies matter significantly for the monetary policymaker in our analysis: in particular the degree of deficit smoothing and the cyclical sensitivity of the deficit have a strong influence. Clearly, the design and implementation of the SGP will have consequences for monetary management. Moreover, the effects of fiscal policy itself are also conditional upon the monetary policy regime and the type of shock facing the EA.
A small sensitivity analysis indicated that varying the degree of fiscal flexibility has different effects across the different type of shocks and the different type of monetary regimes. This hints at a more general issue:
designing monetary and fiscal regimes in the EA is very much interdependent and conditional upon the economic structure and presence of different types of shocks.
Extensions of the analysis could go into several directions: in particular one could envisage: (i) a further working out of the simple rules regimes allowing for various other simple rules e.g. where N t denotes hours of labor, and C t is a composite consumption index. Utility depends not only current but also on past consumption and hours of labour. Households will maximize utility subject to the budget constraint. (1983) . In that case, a fraction of firms, adjusts prices in a optimal forward-looking manner: firms calculate optimal prices for their products considering expected average inflation and also expected marginal costs, which are assumed to be proportional to the output gap, The model (A.5)-(A.6) is a standard linear stochastic regulator problem with rational expectations and forward-looking variables. Determinacy and stability conditions of this class of models are laid out in the seminal paper of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) . Optimal policies can be determined (a) under a regime of policy commitment, (b) under policy discretion (see e.g. Oudiz and Sachs (1985) , Backus and Driffill (1986 ), and Söderlind (1999 ), Jensen (2002 for the detailed working out of the optima; policies under commitment and discretion cases).
In the discretion case, the policymaker reoptimizes each period by taking the process by which private agents form their expectations as given, where the expectations are consistent with actual policies. The optimal reaction function and forward-looking variables will be linear functions of the predetermined variables. The dynamics of the economy are then described by: are partitioned according to X t and x t . Standard solution algorithms (see Söderlind (1999) ) are used to determine H and F and derive the adjustment dynamics and variance-covariance matrices under discretion. In the commitment case, the policymaker optimizes at the beginning of the planning period. The policymaker acts as a Stackelberg leader w.r.t. the private sector, taking into the equations of motion of the forward looking variables (i.e. the expectations of the private agents) as additional constraints It adopts this optimal policy and sticks to it during the entire planning period. The optimal reaction function and the forward-looking variables depend not only on the predetermined variables but also depend on the shadow prices of the forward-looking variables. The latter measure the costs from reneging upon the committed policy. The optimal reaction function commitment solution is determined by a decomposition of the stable eigenvalues from the first-order conditions of the optimization problem (A.2) subject to the transition equation (A.1), see e.g. Söderlind (1999) for the different optimization procedures. In the simple policy rule regime, the Taylor interest rate rule (6) is inserted as tt i QX = into the dynamic system (A.7) instead of the optimal policy, see again Söderlind (1999) Table 2 Bayesian system estimation results of the EA model. 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Inflation (%, p.a.) Effects of deficit smoothing on the variance of the output gap, inflation and losses.
(a) variance of inflation and output for increasing with demand shocks.
(b) variance of inflation and output for increasing with supply shocks.
(c) variance of inflation and output for increasing g λ with demand shocks.
(d) variance of inflation and output for increasing g λ with supply shocks.
Figure 10 Efficient frontier analysis w.r.t. and g λ .
